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Abstract 
 
This paper theoretically and empirically explores the effects of insurance parameters and a 
complementary information environment on patient´s primary prevention activity in the 
context of a managed care organisation. The theoretical model is based on a principal-agent 
setting in which the patient is acting as an agent in deciding about his preventive effort. Both 
for the patient and for the insurer the information distribution about prevention efforts is 
diluted. Hence, the theoretical results reflect the impact of insurance parameters as well as 
complementary information settings.  
The empirical investigation sheds the light on the patient´s prevention decision in the case of 
smoking. This depends on age effects, education, working time and health status. The 
research also stresses the relationship between monetary incentive schemes and individual 
behaviour as well as the influence of additional information schemes. In addition to the 
theoretical results, there is an evidence that changes in health behaviour depend on education 
and individual health assessment, too. 
Keywords: Incentives in Prevention; Information distribution; 
JEL classification: I12, D82, C23 
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1 Introduction and motivation 
The problems of health care sector in the most industrialised countries, especially of the 
Statutory Health Insurances (SHI) in Germany, are the starting point of our paper. On the one 
hand there are the well-known problems of rising expenditures driven by the double aging 
process and its interdependence with the medical-technological progress.1 On the other side, 
there are inappropriate incentives structures that help fostering the altered challenges in health 
care. Especially the discussion about the basic factors for demand in health care offer many 
aspects for outstanding research. Beside the models in the tradition of Grossman illustrating 
the productivity impact upon health one central element for outstanding research is still the 
individual behaviour. Here, especially patient´s health related behaviour and his efforts in 
illness prevention are worth mentioning. It is interesting to observe that people often fail in 
providing the ‘optimal’ amount of prevention. 
Patient’s role in the health production process is one of a productive input factor. Besides his 
therapeutic compliance also the preventive efforts are important for future health care.2 Pri-
mary prevention is concerned with the avoidance of undesirable outcomes whereas secondary 
prevention aims at an early detection of a disease. Each prevention activity sheds the light on 
the relationship between investments in a changed health behaviour or detection activity in 
the present opposed to gains in health in the future3. It is not proven that most preventive care, 
while improving health, actually saves money in the long run. For example Garber and Phelps 
(1997) show that preventive care can provide an improvement in health at relatively low costs 
but does not necessarily lead to a reduction of health care costs. Therefore, prevention is simi-
lar to each investment decision that has to consider the expected benefits against the current 
costs. Hence, the interconnection between activity in the present and the prospective outcome 
in the future becomes more relevant. A strand of literature has expressed concern about a lack 
of individual compliance with prevention recommendations (cf. Kenkel 2000, Hayes 1978 or 
Hayes et. al. 2002). The obvious inconsistency of prevention efforts has been noted in several 
surveys concentrating on secondary prevention activities (e. g. Giveon and Kahan 2000). 
Here, we are interested in the relation between primary prevention, the effects of asymmetric 
                                                 
1 The impact of double aging with respect to German Health Care system are discussed by Breyer and Felder 
(2006) or Zweifel et al. (2004)  
2 We abstain from problems of concomitant compliance that is the influence of physician’s advice and well prac-
tice on patient’s effort activities (cf. e. g. Oberender and Zerth 2007). 
3 It is very important to distinguish between primary and secondary prevention concerning the role of patient and 
physician. Whereas the latter needs the concomitant performance of patient and physician in a form of screening 
vaccine, primary prevention disintegrates the uno-actu-principle of production of prevention goods (cf. similar 
Evans 1988). 
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information and uncertainty, and how it is possible for governments and insurers to encourage 
prevention.  
A classical form of discussing primary prevention problems is related with problems of dis-
cussing decisions for quitting smoking or discussing alcohol abuses. But these models regu-
larly refer to ideas of rational addiction in the sense of Becker and Murphy (1988). Recent 
literature has often added ideas of time-inconsistencies (cf. e. g. Kan 2005) to the explanation 
of addiction which helps to interpret intertemporal investment ideas in a more appropriate 
way. But all these attempts do not consider the expanding role of health care strategies in pre-
vention especially of insurers that focus on different values of private or public information.  
The theoretical literature about prevention in insurance based models is still small. Miceli and 
Heffley (2002) analyse in how far alternative health care financing plans affect the choice of 
preventive care by the consumers and the providers’ choice of capacity. They find that pure 
fee-for-service plans lead to a Pareto-optimal choice of both preventive care and capacity. The 
same result applies to a mixed plan which includes a lump-sum fee and a fee for service. In 
contrast to this a pure prepaid plan may lead to under- or overconsumption of prevention. In 
addition Barigozzi (2004) shows in how far secondary prevention, such as diagnostic screen-
ing, medical examinations and checks-up can be viewed as self-insurance activities. She 
analyses the influence of reimbursement schemes on prevention and treatment. The main 
finding is that the optimal reimbursement scheme encourages treatment and prevention 
whereas for the latter it is required that prevention reduces the cost of treatment. Considering 
these papers there is an open question of the effects of appropriate incentives schemes set by 
an insurer given different levels of information shared by both the patient and the insurer. 
Within this context of patient’s behaviour there arise several important questions. First, it 
seems plausible that the preventive activities depend on the level of insurance as well as on 
the distribution of information between the insurer and the insurant. This raises the question 
of how to deal with this ex ante moral hazard in providing the optimal amount of prevention. 
Second it is interesting to explore the connection between monetary influence parameters e. g. 
co-payments and the impact of intangible costs in consequence of doing prevention. The pa-
per is organised as follows. First we refer to the standard literature concerning a patient-
physician-relationship within a managed-care-environment. After that we develop a model of 
the health care process which resembles screening models in the traditional principal-agent-
literature. The results of our theoretical analysis are tested within an empirical approach using 
data of the SOEP, a representative longitudinal study of private households in Germany.  
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2 Theoretical model 
In our investigation, we make use of a principal-agent setting in which the patient is acting as 
an agent in deciding about his preventive effort. For the sake of simplification, the principal in 
our model is an insurer comparable to an HMO that offers health insurance and decides about 
the necessary treatment in the case of an illness.4 
For the patient’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U, it is assumed that he owns an 
initial wealth W and is risk averse in disposable income (U is concave). The probability of 
getting sick is p, with p∈[0,1]. In the case of illness, the patient suffers a health shock in 
monetary units L. This shock depends negatively on the amount of consumed medical ser-
vices in monetary terms x. Moreover, L is a convex function of x, i.e. L’<0 and L’’>0. This 
formulation implies diminishing marginal benefits of health care. 
The patient can purchase insurance for which he has to pay a premium π. Moreover, in the 
case of treatment, he has to pay a fixed share β of the expenditures for medical treatment (co-
payment: 0≤β<1)). To avoid an illness, the patient engages in preventive activities e that low-
ers the probability of getting sick p(e). These activities are set after the insurance contract has 
been established. Here, we assume that the relation between the probability of an illness and 
prevention is convex, i.e. an additional unit of prevention the patient exceeds lowers the prob-
ability less than the unit before5: 
( ) ( ) 0;0 2
2
>∂
∂<∂
∂
e
ep
e
ep
  
 
The patient‘s prevention e is associated with disutility C(e) which is a convex function of the 
compliance e so the expected utility is additive-separable in income and disutility6. The ex-
pected utility is then: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) [ ] ( )eCWUepxxLWUepEU −−−+−−−= πβπ 1 . (2.1)
 
                                                 
4 Therefore, we differ in the representation of the patient. In other approaches, the patient has the role of the 
principal and the physician is acting as agent (see Zweifel 1994 with an application of the work of Holmström 
1979 to the field of health economics). 
5 This idea is very similar to the attempt used by Miceli and Heffley 2002. It is very important to distinguish 
between the basic probability of getting ill and the effort dependent probability for a better or a worse level of 
given illness. Especially when considering forms of chronic illness the patient has to live with the illness the rest 
of their life after getting ill. Therefore, there will other aspects that may influence the probability of getting ill. 
6 An additive-separable utility function states that the degree of risk-aversion of the income-dependent utility 
(U(.)) does not vary with the effort-level (e) (cf. Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 2001, 19). 
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In the subsequent analysis the following notation is used as a simplification to express the 
patient‘s utility: 
( )[ ]
[ ]π
βπ
−=
−−−=
WUU
xxLWUU
H
S   
 
If the patient is sick, his income-related utility is US, if he is healthy, he only has to pay the 
insurance premium and his utility is denoted UH, with US<UH. 
The insurance company is risk neutral and finances the health care expenditures in the case of 
an illness (p) against a premium π. The insurance pays for all treatment costs except the co-
payment share β. The insurance supplies this service at actuarial fair premiums on a competi-
tive insurance market: 
( )( )xep βπ −= 1  (2.2)
 
2.1 The first-best case: full information 
Under full information the preventive activities of the patient are known to the insurance 
company. Therefore, it is possible to contract contingent on these activities. Moreover, the 
insurer decides about the necessary medical services for treating the illness and the contract 
parameters π and β. As proposed in Stewart (1994) the insurance company maximises pa-
tient’s expected utility subject to its zero profit condition:7 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) [ ] ( )
( )( )xepts
eCWUepxxLWUepEU
xe
βπ
πβππβ
−=
−−−+−−−=
1..
1max
,,,  (2.3)
 
Inserting the zero-profit condition into the objective function reduces the problem to one 
seeking the optimal coinsurance rate, the optimal level of medical services and preventive 
activities: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]
( )( ) [ ] ( )eCxepWUep
xxLxepWUepEU
xe
−−−−
+−−−−=
)1)((1
1max
,,
β
βββ  (2.4)
 
                                                 
7 We do deliberately refrain from aspects of insurer´s self-interest concerning risk selection or rationing.  
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The first-order condition for the preventive activity after rearranging is: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ).()(1)(1)()( eCUepUepxepUUep
e
EU
HSHS ′=′−−′−′−−′⇒∂
∂ β  (2.5)
 
In optimum, the insurance company chooses that level of prevention that equals marginal 
benefits and marginal costs. Here, the marginal costs of prevention (or marginal effort) on the 
right-hand side is rising with an increase in e. On the left-hand side, the first term is the direct 
gain in utility from a decrease of the probability of getting sick. The second term is the indi-
rect effect of a higher prevention level due to the insurance premium of the patient. 
Partial derivation of equation (2.4) with respect to medical services needed x leads to:8 
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(2.6)
 
Generally, the level of medical services depends on the probability of getting ill as well as on 
the co-payments. The last partial derivative is that with respect to the co-payment parameter 
β. After rearranging, it follows that 
,1=′
′⇒∂
∂
S
H
U
UEU
β  (2.7)
 
This means that, given that the patient is fully cured, there is no co-payment necessary for the 
use of medical services and the individual has full coverage. This result depends on the fact 
that the insurer can observe and directly control the patient’s preventive activities so that there 
exist no ex ante moral hazard (within the managed-care environment).9 
With this result which implies that the utilities in both states of nature are equal, it is possible 
to write equation (2.5) as 
CUxep ′=′′− )(  (2.8)
 
                                                 
8 The relation in equation (2.6) requires that the numerator is positive, ∂L/∂x < -β-p(1-β). 
9 At first, this result seems counterintuitive because the co-payment is directly combined with preventive activi-
ties. In the case of asymmetric information where the patient decides about the level of prevention, it is clear that 
there is a relation between preventive activities and coinsurance for medical services. 
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Here, U’ is the marginal utility with U’S=U’H=U’. Using this together with β = 0 simplifies 
the first-order condition for the level of medical services to 
,1)( =′− xL  (2.9)
 
which describes the first-best marginal productivity of medical services x*. 
2.2 Asymmetric information: the patient’s sight 
In the case of asymmetric information, it is not longer possible for the insurance company to 
contract upon the optimal level of prevention. The literature traditionally distinguishes bet-
ween two types of asymmetric informational problems; hidden action and hidden information 
(cf. Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 2001). Although in many cases both forms simulta-
neously exist, we take the contract as set and only concentrate on the informational schemes 
which go along with forms of co-payment and monitoring after the contract parameters are 
known to the patient.10 Hence, the exact problem of our investigation is related to patient’s 
motivation after a definite contract is set and resembles traditional moral hazard schemes. 
In addition, we include a form of monitoring that completes normal incentive constraint used 
in moral hazard approachesOur monitoring scheme describing the typical form of managed 
care environment as a kind of a screening game that differs from the typical approach used in 
the institutional economics literature.11 Opposite to traditional screening models (cf. Macho-
Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 2001) we do not focus on different forms of contracts set by the 
uninformed side to detect the different type of a patient. But similar to a traditional screening 
model, we assume that the uniformed agent is playing first. This is very plausible for a man-
aged care organisation because there are standard contracts set by the insurer. Hence, the pa-
tient is fully informed, so his beliefs are not affected by what he can observe (cf. Rasmusen 
                                                 
10 Hence, patient’s preventive action encompasses both aspects, hidden action and hidden information. 
11 Considering the findings of Shavell (1979), we can conclude that in special forms of principal-agent-problems 
and opposite to the “normal findings”, approaches of ex post detection in form of monitoring could be cheaper 
than alternative ex ante signalling and screening activities. These results especially hold for insurance contracts 
when risk-reducing activities are able to vary to some extent within the insured period of time. 
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1989)12. To sum up, we only concentrate on the patient’s effort activity given an insurance 
contract which has been set before the prevention efforts start.13  
As we have seen in the first-best model, the organisation of an appropriate incentive scheme 
influences the probability of the common investment activities of the patient and an idealistic 
health plan. Similar results are presented in the model of Miceli and Heffley (2002) who pre-
sent the concern of a HMO organisation promoting prevention efforts. Like in typical moral 
hazard models (cf. Zweifel and Manning 2000), one problem for the insurer to fix stable con-
tract condition is the assessment of the patient’s effort behaviour. Therefore, our model has to 
consider two separable problems with hidden information. The first one is the result of a typi-
cal form of lack in patient’s control because opposite to the first-best-case the insurer and the 
patient do not concomitantly maximise their utility function. The second problem is related to 
disturbance in information perception, which is relevant for the insurer as well as the pa-
tient.14 Hence, we face a lack of patient´s control as well as the problem of mutual infor-
mation dilution. 
 The first assumption results in using a form of sequential stages that describe the managed 
care environment sufficiently. In the first stage the uninformed insurer sets her contract pa-
rameter. At the second stage of the game, the patient chooses an amount of prevention efforts 
e in the set of available actions , which combines a high or a low level of prevention. 
Our model focuses at the second stage of the principal-agent-model and discusses the rela-
tionship of different contract parameters with different levels of information. A traditional 
model of asymmetric information would only concentrate on the tangible effect of sequential 
decisions made by the insurer and patient. What is problematic is that we have only implicit 
ideas of the relationship between co-payment and effective effort and when combining the 
control problem with the complementary information problem.  
]1,0[∈e
As a consequence, the insurer itself has to consider the effectiveness of a higher co-payment-
scheme compared to his monitoring activities. In other words, the insurance company has to 
anticipate the patient’s behaviour but is only able to use a signal of the patient’s prevention 
                                                 
12 We discuss a special form of moral hazard with hidden action that belongs to different types of asymmetric 
information. A good review of asymmetric information into pre- and post-contractual cases was introduced by 
Hart and Holmström (1987). 
13 Mas-Colell et. al. (1995) show the different aspects of signalling and screening in order to reveal the type of a 
agent, an aspect which we can only use in a weak form because of the usual conditions of a managed care envi-
ronment. 
14 An instructive and comprehensive overview about different forms of asymmetric cases in context of incentives 
problems describes Mas-Colell et al. (1995). 
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activity. The insurance company could only interpret the type of the patient which depends on 
the signal which is given by the parameter λ ∈ [0,1].15 A value of λ close to one means that 
the value of information is low whereas λ approaching zero goes along with better informa-
tion which can be perceived by the patients as well as the insurer. 
The information signal λ itself depends on the effort level (e) and could be enhanced by addi-
tional monitoring activities (m) done by the insurer. The influence of these two variables can-
not be measured by both parties involved. Due to the inverse relation between a high effort 
level and the value of information of patient’s activity we can set ( 0)(,0)();( >λ ′′<λ′λ eee ). 
The impact of additional monitoring investments shall be contingent on the hidden level of 
prevention effort, e. g. 0100 =→∂∂∪<→∂∂ emem λλ .This means that with perfect prevention 
there is no need to monitor the patient’s activities. 
For that reason we denote the “effectiveness” of monitoring activities by the adaptation of the 
individual co-payment )(* eλβ  scheme which must be completely paid only in case of worst 
information (λ=1). This will be true if the information is completely diluted and no “value of 
information” is available for the insurer. Moreover, the monitoring activity is only perfect 
when λ=0. With other words the effect price for the insurance rises the worse the information 
is perceived by the insurer and the worse the information is revealed by the patient. 
As already mentioned we take a look at a two-stage game and apply the method of backward 
induction. At the first stage, the insurer decides about the level of medical services and con-
tract parameters and at stage two, it is the patient that decides about this utility maximising 
preventive activity. Hence, for the patient at stage two holds: 
)(][))(1()],()([)(max eCWUepmexxLWUepEU
e
−π−−+βλ−−π−=
 (2.10)
 
The first-order condition for this problem is 
( ) Cx
e
UepUUep
e
EU
SHS ′=∂
∂′−−′⇒∂
∂ )()()( λβ  (2.11)
 
                                                 
15 The information disturbance λ is deliberately integrated in the patient’s utility function to show the impact of 
different risk aversion scenarios on the expected valuation. Recent research concerning risk preferences contin-
gent to deductible choice within car-insurance shows a higher heterogeneity of risk preferences compared to the 
risk itself (cf. Cohen and Einav 2007). 
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If λ=0 the last term of the right-hand side of the equation (2.11) vanishes and the simpler form 
of the first-order condition where only the control problem occurs is:  
( ) .)( CUUep
e
EU
HS ′=−′⇒∂
∂  (2.12)
 
Comparing this result with the first-best equation for the prevention activities (2.5) and ig-
noring that β=0 it is obvious that the term ( ) ( )[ ]HS UepUepxep ′−−′−′ )(1)(1)( β is missing. In 
the asymmetric case the patient neglects the effect of his prevention activity on the zero-
profit-condition of the insurance company. Hence, we can infer two problems for the contract 
environment. First, in consequence of the diluted information the insurer cannot directly ob-
serve patient’s prevention activity. Second, the dilution of information goes along with worse 
means for controlling patient’s activities. 
With a look at the equation 2.11 we can elaborate another effect the patient is conscious of in 
the case of an asymmetric information case. The term )()( xeUep S ⋅∂∂⋅′ λβ describes the 
influence of the individual co-payment scheme on the patient’s expected utility for a strictly 
positive value of λ. For λ=0, in equation 2.11 the term of the “first-best expression” 
( ) ( )[ HS UepUepxep ′−−′−′ )(1)(1)( β ]  is missing. If there is perfect information (λ→0), the 
influence of patient´s activity upon the expected utility for both health states US and UH be-
comes evident. Basically, the difference between equation (2.5) and (2.11) is due to the miss-
ing zero profit condition in the maximisation problem under asymmetric information. This 
means that even if the insurer has undertaken some monitoring activities and is perfectly in-
formed about the preventive behaviour, the premium effects of monitoring are not considered 
by the patient. The opposite case is when λ=1 is valid. The term )()( ⋅∂∂⋅′ eUep S λβ  is at a 
maximum und is subtracted from the first part of the equation 2.11. This will only hold if the 
prevention activity e is very low. If λ is at the highest level indicating a low level of patient’s 
prevention effort, equation 2.11 shows the dominant influence of monetary co-payments. But 
the more λ  gets smaller the more information about the prevention activities could be shared 
by both parties of the insurance contract. We can conclude: 
Proposition 1: As long as the information distribution is not perfect, a lower level of preven-
tion activities can be inferred. This result would also be true with corresponding efforts of 
patient control (additional monitoring) because the difference in perception of information 
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has to be considered.16 Hence, we can conclude a lack of information as well as problems of 
appropriate organisational structures for enhancing the co-production of health by the pa-
tient. 
Following that results, it is possible to analyse the effects of contract parameters on the pre-
vention activity. Therefore, we have to consider that in the focus of the insurer, the outcome 
depends not only on the (expected) agent’s effort but also on a monitoring component. Hence, 
the insurer’s break-even-condition must reflect this effect by rearranging the equation (2.2) 
which can be set as: 
 
(2.13)))),(1)((( mxmeep +−= βλπ 17
 
The difference to the first break-even condition is the second term on the right-hand side of 
the equation which is now dependent on signal λ and therefore reflects the insurer’s imagina-
tion of the post-contract patient’s behaviour.  
Considering the influence of the disturbance variable we can conclude that the more informed 
the insurer is the less she additionally needs to increase the co-payment parameter. Differen-
tiating the equation 2.11 over the co-payment parameter the one gets: 
xmeep ),()( λβ
π −=∂
∂
 (2.14)
 
 
Here, the influence of the co-payment parameter on the insurance premium is also contingent 
on the weight set by the illness probability and the perceived information distribution depicted 
inversely by the dilution parameter λ. Therefore, we can denote this effect as direct insurance 
effect. 
By totally differentiating equation (2.11) and taking the result of (2.15) we take a look at the 
“cost sharing-effect” (See appendix for the detailed computation of the effect): 18 
                                                 
16 This result resembles ideas of time-inconsistency where there is a bias in information perception due to strate-
gic intolerance. This effect is not independent on the costs of being intolerant (cf. Brocas and Carillo 2000) 
17 Similar to the assumption of Shavell (c.f. Shavell 1979) the costs of screening are constant and only contingent 
on the probability p(e). 
18 We can denote the denominator as Ω. The value Ω reflects the second derivation of the first-order condition 
und has always to be negative in consequence of the concavity of the utility function (see appendix for the exact 
computation). 
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A priori, the effect of a higher coinsurance level on prevention is ambiguous. Therefore, we 
discuss the influence of a higher cost sharing for different levels of information distribution 
(per variation over λ): 
0
0
=
=λβd
de
 (2.16)
 
With no disturbance in the information distribution there is no additional need to use co-pay-
ments for enhancing prevention activity, which is in fact the first-best case. In other words, 
we have only elaborated the necessary condition for the first-best case. In addition to this re-
sult, we have to consider the impact of this cost-sharing effect upon insurer’s maximisation 
problem at stage one. Therefore, implementing higher co-payments might have an influence 
on the impact of additional monitoring. 
If we instead evaluate the sign of the numerator in expression (2.15)  for λ>0, we find that 
increasing the level of co-payments has a positive effect on preventive activities. 
0
0
>
>λβd
de
 (2.17)
 
Discussing the last equation we can state: If both insurer and insurant do not perceive any 
disturbance in information distribution there is no additional need to use co-payments for en-
hancing prevention activity which is in fact the first-best case. Moreover, focussing on results 
between the extreme values of λ we can infer that there is a need to permanently increase the 
level of effort. The more the information between both parties is diluted the more is a need for 
higher levels of co-payments. In addition, the better the insurer can observe the effort signal 
the better she can set its own assumption of the adequate co-payment parameter β.  
The second contract parameter influencing the decision about preventive activities is the level 
of medical services (x). Regarding typical results elaborated in the literature we can expect a 
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negative relation of higher levels of coverage upon prevention activity (cf. Zweifel and Man-
ning 2000). With respect to the level of medical services, totally differentiation of equation 
2.11 gives together with )),(1)(( meepdx
d βλπ −=  the so called “coverage-effect” (cf. appendix): 
Ω
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(2.18)
 
In this case, the total effect of a higher level of medical services on preventive activities is 
ambiguous. But this result only holds for a level of x greater than the first best level. There-
fore, the impact of a change in x must be simultaneously explored with a change in the values 
of λ between the range λ∈[0,1]. Following the computation given in the appendix we can 
conclude: 
*
*
*
*
0?,
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(2.19)
 
Therefore the following results can be inferred: In contrast to the usual result that a higher 
level of medical services reduces the preventive activities, we find that the coverage level has 
no effect on patient’s activities for a high level of λ. If λ decreases and the information is less 
deluded, the common result holds. Only if the coverage level is above the first best level, 
there might be a complementary relation between coverage and prevention. 
Altogether, the need for additional co-payment is reduced. For x< x*, this leads to the conclu-
sion that a higher level of medical services leads c.p. to a lower prevention activity
)0( <dxde . 
 14
 In order to complete the analysis of the influence of the contract parameters on prevention, 
we look at the monitoring activities of the insurer (m). With regards to our assumption, the 
informed patient can anticipate the efforts of the insurer.19 Therefore it is interesting to show 
the relation between the patient’s prevention effort and the costs of monitoring which could 
be a proxy for the insurer’s own effort of monitoring (“monitoring effect”). 
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When discussing different levels of m we get (compare the whole computation in the appen-
dix): 
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We can conclude that 0>dmde  will be valid if a very high prevention level can be assumed 
but this value alters to 0<dmde  for low levels of e. Hence, patient’s rejection of monitoring 
declines the higher is the level of p(e). In other words, additional monitoring works more pro-
ductive the lower is the probability of getting sick. 
Corollary1: In the case of asymmetric information between the insurer and the patient the 
level of preventive active depends positively on the co-payment but a lower level of co-
payment has to be charged the more the information distribution can be enhanced. Addition-
ally the conflictive relationship between the level of medical service and preventive activities 
becomes more apparent in consequence of a diluted information distribution.  It can be rea-
soned that an increase in monitoring activities can partly compensate charging higher co-
payments but this effect is contingent on a concomitant increase in information.20 
                                                 
19 The patient can interpret the management efforts of the insurer as a proxy for the insurer’s own efforts. 
20 It is assumed that the insurer is able to interpret the signals properly. Screening or monitoring activities work 
as a productive effort enlightening vague information concerning the patient’s preventive efforts but cannot 
investigate the patient completely. 
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2.3 Conclusion of the theoretical model 
To sum up the above findings, asymmetric information has remarkable consequences for the 
individual behaviour and the design of the contract parameters. First of all, the fact that the 
insurance company is unable to observe the preventive activity leads to a lower level of pre-
vention. We could affirm some of the findings of the simpler asymmetric model, especially 
the partly reciprocal relation between co-payment and prevention effort. But there has also 
come true an additional need for an information environment which can be influenced by the 
parties of the treatment. The insurer has an additional parameter for governing patient’s be-
haviour by deciding about monitoring activities. Moreover, the informational distribution 
within the managed care environment plays an important role. The insurer can partly substi-
tute co-payment with more monitoring efforts that could be organised in special forms of 
managed care like disease management or case management. These findings correspond with 
the results outlined in the literature from a medical viewpoint describing the importance of 
good mutual compliance.21 
3 The empirical investigation 
The recent theoretical work has already outlined the mutual necessity of monetary parameters 
and the complementary informational structures which could enforce the effectiveness of pre-
vention efforts. Within our theoretical analysis, we concentrated on the second stage of the 
model for describing the structure and the process of managed care concerning better preven-
tion activities. Therefore, the empirical analysis concentrates on the effects at stage two that 
directly describes the patient’s role in prevention activities. In detail, we look at the preven-
tion activities of an individual and in how far contract parameters of health insurance systems 
and information have an impact on this behaviour. From the results of the theoretical model, 
we are able to derive the following two testable hypotheses: 
1. Contract parameters influence the prevention decision. 
2. Health status and information are related to the individual perception of prevention. 
The first hypothesis describes the findings that the individual’s prevention decision depends 
on the influence of co-payments (cost-sharing effect) and on the coverage defined in the con-
tract (coverage effect). The second hypothesis captures aspects of individual behaviour that 
are not directly implemented in the theoretical model and the influence of insurer’s monitor-
ing activities. Here, it is important that individual’s health status might be on the one hand the 
                                                 
21 Cf. Dracup and Meleis (1982) or Greenlund et al (2000). Greenlund et al stress the importance of the positive 
impact on the patient’s effort when there is a consistent and truthful behaviour of the clinician. 
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result of preventive action but on the other hand reflects the experience with medical care as 
well as health relevant behaviour and influences the decision. Moreover, a better informed 
individual tends to behave c. p. in a healthier manner than an uninformed would do. 
Our variable of interest is the primary preventive behaviour of a patient. This is a multidimen-
sional construct depending on a variety of health behaviours that cannot be observed directly. 
Therefore, we have to reformulate our notion of prevention. Instead of a general concept of 
prevention, we use a specific form of health relevant behaviour, namely people’s attitude to-
wards smoking. In detail, we look at the individual decision to change this behaviour. Starting 
with a set of individuals who are current smokers in the relevant year, we can observe their 
decision to quit or to go on smoking. For this variable, a series of eight years is available that 
allows us to study changes in preventive behaviour in the context of different insurance sys-
tems. 
The empirical literature on health related behaviour and especially smoking is huge. Kenkel 
(1991) for example analyses the relation between school attendance, smoking, alcohol con-
sumption, and exercises. As an explanatory variable, he uses the answer to the question 
whether an individual is aware of the health risks that are related to a specific behaviour. As a 
result, better health knowledge leads individuals to behave healthier, e. g. to smoke less. An 
instrumental-variable approach in the estimation of the number of cigarettes smoked is pre-
sented by Mullahy (1997). After correcting for unobserved heterogeneity, cigarette price, in-
come age and education can be identified to influence the amount of smoking. Foster and 
Jones (2001) investigate the role of tobacco taxes in starting and quitting smoking. For British 
data, they get the result that higher taxes lead to a lower consumption of tobacco products. 
The effect of health behaviours on the individual perception of health is at the core of a paper 
by Contoyannis and Jones (2004). They find that non-smokers have a higher perception of the 
individual health status than smokers have. Kenkel et al (2006) look at the educational effects 
on the decision to smoke. Using high school competition and GED receipt as possible sources 
for a good health behaviour, they show that a high school degree goes along with a lower 
probability to smoke but has no effect on other health variables like obesity. Cowell (2006) 
investigates the future effects of current health behaviours and finds that future opportunity 
costs affect the smoking decision. Moreover, the number of schooling years has a negative 
impact on cigarette smoking. By using dummy variables for different educational degrees, he 
finds a negative gradient in higher education. 
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3.1 Data 
The data we use is from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a representative longitu-
dinal study of private households in Germany.22 Explicitly, we use the waves of the years 
1995-2002. With respect to our indicator for primary prevention, we use questions of the year 
2002 were respondents are asked to report the year starting and stopping smoking. With this 
information we construct a variable that displays for each year of our analysis whether the 
individual smokes or not. Starting with the year 1995, our dataset consists of 1470 individuals 
that are smokers in that year. In the last year of our sample, we observe only 1218 individuals 
are assessed to be smokers. Therefore, 271 individuals did indeed quit smoking resulting in 
10850 observations for the eight years 
The independent variables can be divided into four different categories (see table 1): The first 
category contains predisposing variables like gender and nationality. Five age categories are 
included and additionally, the variables ‘partnership’ and ‘children’ are indicators for the fam-
ily status of the respondent. All of these variables are binary ones. Second, socioeconomic 
variables are included to explain general economic conditions. The first variable in this group 
determines the money spendable for consumer and health care goods, namely the household 
income. Here, we use the logarithm of the net household income to correct for the skewness 
of the density function. As the size of the household differs for the respondents, we use the 
household equivalent income. Moreover, we include a dummy variable stating whether an 
individual faces serious economic worries about the future. The second group of variables 
within this category are educational variables. Third, we include variables concerning the 
workload or whether an individual is unemployed. Last, a regional dummy for Eastern Ger-
many should measure remaining differences in preventive behaviour. 
Health and insurance variables build up the third category. In this group of variables the re-
spondent’s insurance status is included. We use two variables to test for hypothesis 1. First, 
we look at the insurance system, i.e. whether the individual is fully private insured or insured 
in the Statutory Health Insurance (SHI). Second, we take into account that members of the 
latter group might buy supplemental coverage. Both, fully private and supplemental coverage 
go along with a broader coverage and a cost-sharing structure that differs from that in the SHI 
where co-payments are low. In detail, contracts for full private insurance often go along with 
different forms of cost-sharing like co-insurance or deductibles that are not common in the 
                                                 
22 The data used in this publication were made available to us by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin. 
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SHI.23 Moreover, as supplemental insurance results in a broader coverage this corresponds to 
a reduction of cost sharing because in the SHI these services are not included and therefore, a 
cost sharing of 100 percent is charged. Finally, to capture health effects of long-time smoking, 
we include the health capital stock of the individual in relation to others in the relevant year. 
With this construction, we analyse the effect of health status on health relevant behaviour. 
Additionally, the age at which the individual started smoking serves as a proxy for the inten-
sity of smoking in years. An overview over some descriptive statistics for the first year in the 
sample is given in table 2. 
Table 1: Description of the variables 
Variable description 
nonsmoker non-smoker yes/no 
Predisposing variables 
age < 30 respondent less than 30 years old yes/no 
age 30 - 45 respondent 30 to 45 years old yes/no 
age 46 - 60 respondent 46 to 60 years old yes/no 
age 601- 75 respondent 61 to 75 years old yes/no 
age >75 respondent older than 75 years yes/no 
female 1 = female, 0 = male 
partner living together with a partner yes/no 
foreigner children under 16 in household yes/no 
children < 16 nationality not German yes/no 
Socioeconomic variables 
Eastern Germany living in Eastern Germany yes/no 
O-level first public examination in secondary school yes/no 
high school general qualification for university entrance yes/no 
university university degree yes/no 
eq. hh-income Log equivalent household net income in  € d 
economic worries strong worries about own economic situation yes/no 
working time number of hours worked regularly 
working time sq. number of hours worked regularly sq 
unemployed unemployed yes/no 
insurance and health variables 
private insurance fully private insured yes/no 
supplementary ins. private supplemental insurance yes/no 
health status health capital stock 
age started smok-
ing 
age at which the respondent first smoked 
  
                                                 
23 From an international perspective, the co-payments in the German private health insurance sector are still 
comparatively low. 
 19
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the first wave (1995): 1470 observations 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
nonsmoker 0.0238 0.1525 0 1 
age < 30 0.2558 0.4364 0 1 
age 31 - 45 0.4245 0.4944 0 1 
age 46 - 60 0.2367 0.4252 0 1 
age 61 - 75 0.0762 0.2654 0 1 
age >75 0.0068 0.0822 0 1 
female 0.4136 0.4926 0 1 
partner 0.7510 0.4326 0 1 
foreigner 0.1604 0.3670 0 1 
children < 16 0.4313 0.4953 0 1 
Eastern Germany 0.3027 0.4596 0 1 
O-level 0.2816 0.4499 0 1 
high school 0.0769 0.2665 0 1 
university 0.1401 0.3472 0 1 
eq. hh-income 7.7202 0.4299 4.9416 10.1165 
economic worries 0.2252 0.4178 0 1 
working time 28.6830 20.5206 0 80 
working time sq. 1243.4930 1051.9280 0 6400 
unemployed 0.0633 0.2435 0 1 
private insurance 0.04423 0.2056 0 1 
supplementary ins. 0.03673 0.1882 0 1 
health status 0 1 -8.9966 1.0132 
age started smo-
king 
18.0429 4.6307 7 53 
 
3.2 Estimation method 
We study the decision to quit smoking by estimating discrete-time hazard functions. There-
fore, our unit of analysis is the time at risk of the event “stop smoking”. In detail, we apply 
the stock-sampling approach specified by Jenkins (1995) meaning that we use an unbalanced 
panel data structure (cf. Wooldridge (2002), p. 700). This means that for the first period t=τ, 
only those individuals that currently smoke are in the sample. Then, for the following periods, 
we drop all those individuals that quit smoking. Over the whole sample period, 218 of the 
original 1470 individuals changed their health related behaviour. This means that we observe 
two types of individuals. First those who quit smoking in t=τ+si and second those for which 
the observation period ends in t=τ+si before the might have quit (interview data). In the first 
case, one can speak of a complete duration data (complete spell δi=1) whereas in the second 
case, we have censored duration data (δi=0). 
For the estimation at hand, the probability to quit smoking at time t incorporates information 
on the duration distribution. Following Jenkins (1995), the discrete-time hazard rate hit is: 
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Here, Xit is a vector of covariates that varies over time and Ti is a discrete random variable 
representing the time at which the smoking period ends. Then, the conditional probability of 
observing an incomplete spell at a given time period is given by: 
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For the whole sample, the resulting log-likelihood of observing the smoking history data can 
be written as: 
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To simplify the estimation method, Jenkins defines the variable yit=1 if t=τ+si and δi=1 and 
yit=0 otherwise. Hence, for all individuals who carry on smoking during the complete sample 
period, yit=0 and for those who quit smoking, yit=0 for the periods prior to the one when they 
stop smoking, where yit=1. Then, the log-likelihood corresponds to the following expres-
sion:24 
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Hence, the estimation is carried out using a standard log-likelihood but the dataset is organ-
ised differently using the stock sampling approach. In detail, this means that for each individ-
                                                 
24 It is worth mentioning that the above log-likelihood function has the same form as a standard log-likelihood 
when estimating models for a binary variable (yit) (cf. Jenkins (1995), p. 134). 
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ual, there are as many data rows as there are time intervals at risk of the event ‘quit smoking’ 
for each person (cf. Jenkins (1997), p. 112).25 
For a complete specification, the expression for the hazard rate has to be determined. Jenkins 
uses a complementary log-log hazard rate that is defined as follows:26 
( )[ ]{ } ( )[ ] ( ) itititit XthXth β′+θ=−−⇔β′+θ−−= 1loglogexpexp1  (3.6)
 
Here, θ(t) is the baseline hazard. The model allows for a non-parametric form of this baseline 
hazard with a separate parameter for each duration interval (cf. Jenkins (1997), p. 110).27 This 
is done by including a dummy variable for each year with 1995 as reference group. Moreover, 
a second version of the discrete-time proportional hazards model incorporates a gamma-dis-
tributed random variable to describe unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. 
3.3 Modeling individual’s health stock 
According to our second hypothesis, individual health status plays a crucial role in determin-
ing preventive behaviour. In the SOEP data measures of health like self-assessed health are 
included. Such measures of health and their validity have caused a considerable debate (cf. 
Jones (2007), p. 21). Concerning these variables, the self-assessed health that is part of the 
dataset might be vulnerable to a reporting bias because of anticipation and measurement er-
rors (cf. Hagan et al. (2006), p. 11 and Hernández-Quevedo et al. (2005), p. 4). The original 
self-assessed health variable is a five-point scale variable ranging from very good to bad. To 
correct for a possible bias, we apply a technique proposed by Disney et al. to correct for a 
possible reporting bias. We estimate a model of self-assessed health as a function of objective 
health measures m, e.g. the utilisation of health care or physical and mental well being as well 
as personal characteristics x like age and education (cf. Disney et al. (2006), pp. 625). First, 
we can write the unobservable health status as a function of x and m: 
ηit = x 'it β + m 'it γ + uit  (3.7)
 
                                                 
25 For the specification presented, it follows that there are τ+si rows for each individual i=1,…n. 
26 One main property of this specification is that the resulting model is the discrete-time counterpart of an under-
lying continuous-time proportional hazards model (cf. Jenkins (1997), p. 134). 
27 Alternatively, using a Weibull distribution or a Cox-hazard model to estimate the model leads to comparable 
results but assumes a specific baseline hazard. The main advantage of our approach is that no explicit functional 
form for the baseline hazard has to be specified and that this non-parametric form also allows for a non-mono-
tonic function. 
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Instead of ηit, self-assessed health hit is observed in the data set. The latent health stock h* is 
the counterpart of the observed self-assessed health and is a function of the unobservable 
health status ηit and a reporting error εit: 
h*it = ηit + εit  (3.8)
 
The latent health variable can be linked to the dichotomous indicator hit using the following 
observation mechanism: 
hit = j , if μj-1 < h*it < μj , j = 1 , … , 5  (3.9)
 
Equation (3.9) shows that our observable health variable takes the value j if the latent health 
stock lies between the two thresholds µj-1 and µj. Combining the observation mechanism with 
equation (3.7), the model can be estimated using ordered probit techniques. Following Disney 
et al. (2006), we estimate the health stock for each wave separately using the wave specific 
values of m and x. Using the predicted values form these estimations, we can normalise the 
health stock using a z-transformation. This yields to a health capital stock that has a zero 
mean and a constant variance of one for each wave. Furthermore, positive values of our health 
capital stock variable indicate that the respondent’s health is above the sample mean in this 
period. 
3.4 Results 
The estimation results for the second version of the hazard model that incorporates individual 
heterogeneity are obtainable from table 3. There, in the second column, the value of the esti-
mated coefficient is presented. Columns three and four show the z-value and the p-value and 
the last column gives the hazard ratio. A value greater than one means that the specific factor 
increases the probability of quitting smoking whereas a value below one denotes the reverse 
interpretation. In the group of predisposing and family variables, only the two age dummies 
for the highest classes show a significant positive influence. This means that older people tend 
to stop smoking more often than younger people do.28 There is no difference between our 
reference group (younger than 30) and the age classes between 30 and 60 years. This effect 
                                                 
28 It is important to mention that we do not possess any information about the reasons why people quit smoking,, 
i.e. we have no data on whether the decision might be physician initiated or not. 
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maybe due to illness experiences related to smoking and could be interpreted as an effect of a 
higher risk aversion. 
In the group of socioeconomic variables, it is remarkable that people in Eastern Germany 
have a higher probability of stopping smoking. First, in our sample 30 % of the smokers in the 
year 1996 live in Eastern Germany compared to 19 % for the whole population, which means 
that this group has a higher tendency to smoke. Second, there seem to remain differences in 
living habits and conditions between east and west several years after the reunification. From 
the subgroup of educational dummies, only the one for a university degree is significantly 
positive. If we interpret this as a better capability to process the available information and this 
confirms our hypothesis that information is one key for enhancing prevention activities. The 
household income does not show a significant effect but the influence of the variable eco-
nomic worries is strongly negative. Worries about the future economic situation can then be 
interpreted as a proxy of social status leading to the conclusion that people with strong wor-
ries and therefore low status tend to quit smoking less often than others do. Concerning the 
working time, we observe a non-linear effect. First, increases in working time decrease the 
probability of stopping smoking. This may result due to work related burdens and stress. Sec-
ond, with a further increase, the magnitude of this effect decreases. 
For the group of health and insurance variables, our measure of the health capital stock shows 
a significantly positive sign resulting in a lower probability of quitting. Here, we have instru-
mented the original self-assessed health variable using age and educational variables as well 
as measures of physical and psychical well being and the utilisation of medical care. There-
fore, one can conclude that people in a good health status and with fewer experiences con-
cerning e.g. respiratory diseases caused by smoking do not feel the pressure to change their 
preventive behaviour. 
Neither the age when the respondent started smoking nor the insurance variables have any 
effect on the decision to quit smoking. Therefore, we cannot draw a conclusion concerning 
our first hypothesis. This result may be due to our data availability. First, our insurance dum-
mies only capture in which system the individual is insured or whether there exists supple-
mental insurance. In Germany, about 90 % of the population are compulsory insured in the 
Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) and only people with an earned income above the compul-
sory insurance income threshold are qualified to choose between social and private insurance. 
Moreover, people working as civil servant are partly privately insured. Therefore, insurance 
status incorporates also information about socioeconomic status, profession and the status and 
 24
education of the parents. Second, three effects could be derived from the theoretical model but 
from our data it is not possible to separate these effect. To do so, it would have been neces-
sary to have information on coverage, co-payments and insurer behaviour. Instead, we only 
have the information about the insurance system.  
For the SHI insured individuals this means that there is no variation in the insurance contract 
because with few exceptions, benefits catalogue and co-payments are settled by the govern-
ment. Third, our prevention variable ‘”quit smoking” covers only one single aspect of the 
multidimensional factor preventive activities. 
Table 3: Estimation results 
hazard coefficient z P>|z| hazard r. 
predisposing and family variables 
age 31 - 45 0.1907 0.56 0.571 1.2100 
age 46 - 60 0.7255 1.52 0.131 2.0658 
age 61 - 75 1.1127** 1.82 0.069 3.0424 
age >75 1.7531* 1.65 0.103 5.7721 
female -0.3314  -1.10 0.269 0.7179 
partner 0.2838 0.97 0.330 1.3282 
foreigner 0.4044 0.96 0.336 1.4984 
children < 16 -0.2211  -0.84 0.396 0.8016 
socioeconomic variables 
Eastern Germany 0.6736* 1.73 0.086 1.9612 
O-level 0.3555 1.03 0.302 1.4269 
high school 0.4646 1.07 0.273 1.5913 
university 1.1489*** 2.57 0.010 3.1546 
eq. hh-income -0.1531  -0.49 0.628 0.8580 
economic worries -0.4344**  -1.88 0.060 0.6476 
working time -0.0330**  -2.04 0.040 0.9675 
working time sq. 0.0007** 2.55 0.011 1.0007 
unemployed -0.1850  -0.47 0.638 0.8311 
insurance and health 
private insurance 0.1386 0.38 0.703 1.1486 
supplementary ins. 0.3289 0.94 0.348 1.3895 
health status -0.2964*** -2.96 0.004 0.7435 
age started smoking -0.0316  -1.02 0.311 0.9689 
constant -2.9011  -1.21 0.223  
d96 0.1276 0.42 0.677  
d97 0.5076 1.35 0.177  
d98 1.0718** 2.34 0.019  
d99 1.2862** 2.29 0.022  
d00 1.9986*** 2.94 0.003  
d01 2.8025*** 3.19 0.001  
d02 2.0021** 2.06 0.041  
Gamma var. 13.2575*** 2.61 0.000  
LR test (χ²) 16.8519***  0.000  
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The time dummies show a significant effect from the year 1998 on stating that we have a non-
monotonic increase of the baseline hazard. In detail, we observe an increasing effect over time 
but for the year 2002 it decreases. During this time period, cigarette prices in Germany in-
creased from 12.38 to 14.80 cent/cigarette (cf. van Deuverden (2004), p. 12). At the same 
time, tobacco taxes grew from 6.96 to 8.62 cent/cigarette. Therefore, one can conclude that 
the observed coefficients of the baseline hazard show to a great deal the effect of taxes and 
price increases. Finally, a likelihood ratio test is performed to check whether a model in-
cluding individual heterogeneity using a gamma mixture distribution fits better than the stan-
dard Bernoulli distribution. Here, the hypothesis that there exists no difference between the 
two models can be rejected at the 1 % level of significance.  
4 Conclusion and aspects for ongoing research 
Our analysis describes the hidden conflict between the two aspects in the trade-off between 
the disutility of prevention activities and the probability of illness. In detail, the effects of an 
insurance contract on preventive behaviour work through the co-payment the patient has to 
bear, the coverage of medical services and the monitoring activities that the insurer performs. 
In the analysis at hand, we assumed the patient’s ability to fully control his prevention activi-
ties. But the comparison of investment in prevention in the present time and the expected out-
come in the future may possible lose sight of the utilities of prevention goods when doing 
prevention. Therefore, Cohen and Mooney (1984) distinguish between the utility in use and 
the utility in anticipation when doing prevention.  
Our empirical specification tried to test the hypotheses of the theoretical part using German 
micro data. Applying a discrete-time proportional hazards model to the question of quitting 
smoking as a proxy of preventive behaviour, we find evidence that health capital stock and 
information play a central role in the decision about prevention. For the data at hand, the ef-
fects of different insurance systems remain unclear for two reasons. First, health insurance 
serves as a kind of proxy for socioeconomic status and second, we do not find much variation 
in the data because information on co-payments and coverage is missing. Moreover, our vari-
able of health behaviour (quit smoking) covers only a small part of preventive activities. 
Further research have to be undertaken for illustrating a better understanding of stable preven-
tion efforts over a longer period of time. In fact, short look at recent literature shows different 
attempts by using time inconsistency models or ideas relating to the older forms of rational 
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addiction29. It could be possible that fewer co-payments could decrease pharmaceutical costs 
at the moment but is confronted with higher life-time costs in the future compared with mod-
els with fewer co-payments30. Moreover, the interrelation between information distribution 
within a managed care environment caring for chronic diseases and the impact of information 
upon the valuation of non-monetary losses due to chronic diseases has to be explored. For a 
forthcoming exploration, we might discuss “positive disutilities” when doing prevention 
which probably go along with a time-dependent prevention path. 
Moreover there is still a lack in discussing concomitant patients and physicians behaviour 
over a longer period of time which helps enhancing viable prevention settings. Recent re-
search activities, e. g. Treadwell and Lenert (1999) and Winter et al (2003) have outlined the 
health state dependency of medical treatment. The next steps for discussing could be an inves-
tigation of changing of the values of contract parameters contingent to the level of sickness 
probability and the distance to an expected illness.  
 
 
29 Cf. Yaniv 2006 who compares different models of explaining behaviour of addiction. In addition, our ap-
proach is to figure out the basic difference between addiction problems and problems of prevention activities in 
moral hazard surroundings. The former models stress ideas of time inconsistency whereas the latter concentrate 
on governing incentives. 
30 Some empirical models discussing different indications explore the effects of differences in co-payment 
schemes on the long-term medical adherence (cf. Hsu et. al. 2006 or Chandra et. al. 2007). 
Appendix: Computation of the theoretical model 
a) Co-payment effect 
By totally differentiating equation (2.11) and taking the result of (2.15) we can formulate with 
respect to coinsurance the “cost sharing-effect”, that generally can be written as:  
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The sign of (A-1) depends on the disturbance variable. Considering that the denominator of 
(A-1) is negative and the case that λ=0, from the fact that 0→∂
∂
e
λ  one gets:  
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If instead the parameter λ in the numerator is greater than zero we can show that the numera-
tor will always be smaller than zero. The numerator increases the more λ approaches 1. Hence 
we can set: 
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This result only holds when 0),(,max),(min),( <∂
∂→∂
∂−>→∂
∂−
e
megivene
e
mee
e
me λλλ  which must be true 
by assumption. 
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b) Coverage Effect 
Totally differentiating of equation 2.11 relating to the coverage x gives the following result: 
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Again, the denominator is sufficient condition for a utility maximum and negative. For the 
numerator, the second term is always positive (considering times -1) and the fourth term is 
always positive. The third term will also be positive as long as  holds. The first term 
will be positive as long as 
0<′′SU
)())(1)(( eeepxL βλβλ −−−<∂∂  is valid. Taken into account the 
convexity of the loss function the result holds for all level of medical services smaller than the 
first best which was set in equation 2.6. If the level of medical services exceeds the first best 
x*, the derivative of the loss function with respect to x decreases. By this, it is more likely that 
)())(1)(( eeepxL βλβλ −−−>∂∂  holds. 
By inserting λ=0 the reduced fraction can be depicted as follows:  
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Discussing the reduced numerator we see that the second and the third part will be always 
positive and the last part will be negative. Hence, the complete numerator will be positive if 
the first part is also positive and the sum of the first three parts exceeds the last part. Focus-
sing the first term and considering again that L(x) and p(e) are both convex, this can only be 
true if L’<-p(e) holds which must be true if x<x* is valid. But this assumption is only neces-
sary and not sufficient because 
x
Lep
e ∂
∂<
→max
)(  has to be also valid. The more p(e) reacts to altera-
tion in prevention effort the higher is the probability that the sufficient condition can be ac-
cepted.  
Regard to formula A-4 and considering the other level of λ=1 only L’<-p(e) (1-β)-β is left for 
discussion in the numerator. This expression is always valid if and only if L(x) is convex 
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which must be true by assumption and the co-payment level is not too high. The more x is re-
duced the more additional β is necessary for fulfilling the inequality. Hence the “productivity” 
of additional co-payments diminishes.  
c) Monitoring Effect 
Totally differentiating equation 2.11 with respect to monitoring efforts gives: 
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For discussing the numerator, we must split it into the separate terms and considering differ-
ent levels of prevention activity e. Because of the expected negative impact of an additional 
amount of monitoring on the disturbance variable 0<∂∂ mλ  we can assert the second term 
will be always positive. The sign of the fourth term depends on the sign of the cross deriva-
tion me∂∂∂ λ2 , which reflects the impact of monitoring on the marginal product of preven-
tion on information. As long as more monitoring enhances the information transmission of 
patient’s prevention, the forth term is positive. 
For the first and the third term, their sign depends on the expression in brackets: 
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The exact sign is influenced by the contract parameters coverage level, co-payment and moni-
toring. Moreover, the probability of getting sick depends on the prevention level. Given that 
this probability is bounded between 0 and 1 and that p is a convex function of effort, the ex-
pression is c.p. positive for lower preventive activities. Independent of this intermediate re-
sult, the signs of the first and the second term always point in same direction.  
Assuming that the cross derivation of the disturbance term is zero, for a high probability of 
getting sick, the effect of better monitoring on prevention is negative. In contrast, for a given 
low probability of getting sick the effect of monitoring on prevention might turn positive. 
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Hence, as the probability depends on the preventive effort, this result means that for higher 
levels of prevention better monitoring has a positive effect. 
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